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   n 2019, a report indicated that China was building a variant of the YJ-18 
long-range cruise missile that can be fired from standard shipping containers 
loaded on Chinese-flagged merchant vessels.1 Given that China is the sec-
ond-largest ship-owning nation in the world, controlling over 5,600 vessels 
with a capacity of 270 million deadweight tonnage (dwt),2 deploying con-
tainer-launched missiles on its merchant fleet would significantly enhance 
China’s warfighting capabilities. The State-owned China Ocean Shipping 
Company (COSCO) is the world’s largest shipping company with over 800 
merchant vessels (74.5 million dwt).3 It is the world’s third-largest container 
shipping company, operating 507 container vessels with a combined capacity 
of 3.1 million twenty-foot equivalent units, which could be equipped with 
these new lethal missile batteries.4  
The Chinese missile system is similar to the Russian Klub-K container 
missile system. Once perfected, it will provide China with a long-range pre-
cision strike capability that can engage both surface combatants and land-
based targets. Some of the advantages of the container-launched system in-
clude:  
 
(1) The missiles are housed in a standard maritime shipping con-
tainer, making them difficult to detect. 
(2) The system can be designed to use containers of different load-
ing capacities (e.g., 20- or 40-foot containers) depending on the mis-
sion. 
                                                                                                                      
1. China is Building Long-range Cruise Missiles Launched from Ship Containers, NAVY RECOG-
NITION (Apr. 2019), https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/ 
2019/april/6971-china-is-building-long-range-cruise-missiles-launched-from-ship-contain-
ers.html. 
2. Deadweight (dwt) is defined as the measure of the ship’s carrying capacity, taking 
into consideration the weight of the cargo on board, fuel, ballast water, fresh water, crew, 
and provisions for the crew, but excluding the weight of the ship. 
3. China Has Become the World’s Second-largest Ship-Owning Nation, ISL, https://www.isl. 
org/en/news/china-become-the-worlds-second-largest-ship-owning-nation (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2021).  
4. Biggest Shipping Companies: Top Ten by TEU Capacity, SHIP TECHNOLOGY (last updated 














(3) The loaded containers can be delivered using civilian logistics, 
thereby avoiding attention. 
(4) The missile system can be deployed from sea, rail, truck, or 
ground platforms. 
(5) The missiles can be launched autonomously using targeting data 
from an external source.  
 
The missile system can be equipped with active or passive target acqui-
sition and designation systems that allow it to detect, identify, bear, and de-
termine target coordinates at a distance exceeding the missile range. The sys-
tem can also receive targeting data from coastal, shipborne, airborne, or sat-
ellite systems.5  
In 2016, China superseded its 1995 Regulation on National Defense 
Transportation with a new law. The National Defense Transportation Law6 
clarifies the requirements of civil transportation resources to support military 
operations “to improve the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] ability to lev-
erage civilian carriers to support strategic projection.”7 The new law also cre-
ates a “strategic projection support force” made up of large- and medium-
sized Chinese shipping companies organized into “strategic projection sup-
port units,” responsible for providing “rapid, long-distance, and large-scale 
national defense transportation support.”8 National defense mobilization 
standards are promulgated by the National Transportation War Readiness 
Office, which is under the supervision of the Transport and Projection Bu-
reau of the Central Military Committee (CMC) Logistic Support Depart-
ment. Civilian carriers are under the command and control of the five The-
ater Commands and the Joint Logistics Support Force, a subordinate com-
mand of the CMC that supports the PLA for all general logistics require-
ments.9 The law also requires that future Chinese commercial shipping be 
                                                                                                                      
5. Club-K, ROSOBORONEXPORT, http://roe.ru/esp/catalog/marina-de-guerra/armas-
de-la-nave/klab-k/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2021). 
6. National Defense Transportation Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted 
by the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress, Sept. 3, 2016, effective 
Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2016-09/03/content_1996764. 
htm (unofficial English translation). 
7. CONOR KENNEDY, CHINA MARITIME REPORT NO. 4: CIVIL TRANSPORT IN PLA 














“designed, built and managed to support future military operations” during 
times of war.10  
 Some commercial vessels have already been modified and have par-
ticipated in PLA Navy (PLAN) exercises. In 2020, naval engineers installed 
a removable helicopter deck on a heavy-lift ship, converting it into a de facto 
assault ship/expeditionary sea-base to support amphibious operations.11 A 
2021 report indicated that China is also converting roll-on roll-off (RORO) 
passenger/car ferries to allow them to launch armed amphibious vehicles in 
support of amphibious operations.12 These vessels can carry up to 1,200 pas-
sengers and have a 2,740-foot vehicle lane capacity on their main and lower 
decks, which equates to an amphibious mechanized infantry battalion. As 
cross-strait tensions increase, raising the possibility of a conflict with Taiwan, 
these converted RORO vessels will significantly enhance the PLAN’s am-
phibious capabilities. As a proof of concept, the converted 15,560-ton 
RORO ferry Bang Chui Dao participated in a landing exercise with the PLAN 
in the summer of 2020 on the coast of Guangdong Province.13 This impro-
vised fleet of converted merchant vessels could be used to provide additional 
inexpensive lift capacity to support an invasion of Taiwan. 
While none of these activities are illegal per se, they raise potential con-
cerns under the law of naval warfare. These concerns are compounded given 
China’s disregard for its international legal obligations under a number of 
treaties, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),14 the Convention on the International Regulations for Prevent-
ing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS),15 and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention 
                                                                                                                      
10. David Axe, Thousands Of Ships, Millions Of Troops: China Is Assembling a Huge Fleet for 
War with Taiwan, FORBES (July 27, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/ 
07/27/thousands-of-ships-millions-of-troops-china-is-assembling-a-huge-assault-flotilla-
for-a-possible-attack-on-taiwan/?sh=36dd71d3751b. 
11. David Axe, Surprise! The Chinese Navy Just Transformed This Cargo Ship into an Instant 
Helicopter Carrier, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/ 
08/22/surprise-the-chinese-navy-just-transformed-this-cargo-ship-into-an-istant-helicop-
ter-carrier/?sh=5d2515591d44. 
12. Conor Kennedy, Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift, 
The Jamestown Foundation (July 16, 2021), https://jamestown.org/program/ramping-the-
strait-quick-and-dirty-solutions-to-boost-amphibious-lift/.  
13. Id. 
14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
15. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 











(SOLAS).16 Using converted commercial ships in a military support role also 
increases the risk that all Chinese-flagged merchant vessels in the area of 
operations will be targeted as military objectives during an armed conflict 
given that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between a con-
verted and non-converted vessel, particularly container ships armed with 
Klub-K missile batteries.  
This article will briefly review the law applicable during an international 
armed conflict (IAC) at sea. It will also discuss the law of armed conflict 
(LOAC) requirements that apply to the conversion of merchant ships into 
warships, as well as issues related to the inviolability of neutral merchant 
ships during an IAC at sea. Finally, it will address the limited protections 
afforded enemy civilian passenger vessels against destruction and the poten-
tial implications of using such vessels to actively support naval forces during 
offensive operations. 
 
II. WARSHIPS AND BELLIGERENT RIGHTS 
 
Only warships and military aircraft may exercise belligerent rights during an 
IAC at sea.17 These rights include, inter alia, the right to conduct offensive 
attacks (kinetic or non-kinetic), the right of visit and search, the right of cap-
ture, the right to take reprisals, the right to control neutral vessels and aircraft 
in the immediate vicinity of naval operations. Other vessels, such as naval 
                                                                                                                      
16. International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea, 1974, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 
U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2.   
17. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1, 15 MAR-
TENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 791, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 89 (1907); Convention No. VII Relating to the Conversion of 
Merchant Ships into Warships, Oct 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 319 [hereinafter Hague VII]; 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 
GOVERNING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS art. 12 (1913), reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 1123 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 4th ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WARFARE]; OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS, NWIP 10-2, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE § 500e (1955), reprinted in ROBERT W. 
TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 359, 394 (1955) (vol. 50, Interna-
tional Law Studies) [hereinafter NWIP 10-2]; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST 
GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS § 2.2.1 (2017) [hereinafter COM-
MANDER’S HANDBOOK]; OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 13.3.2 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL]; FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (Germany), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CON-











auxiliaries and merchant vessels, even when carrying out support services for 
the naval forces, are not entitled to engage in belligerent acts during an IAC, 
but they may defend themselves, to include resisting attacks by enemy 
forces.18 
A “warship” is defined as  
 
a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks 
distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an of-
ficer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name 
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a 
crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.19  
 
This definition originated during the negotiations of 1907 Hague VII and is 
widely accepted as customary international law.20 Warships do not have to 
be armed but must be under the command of a duly commissioned officer 
and manned by a qualified crew subject to armed forces discipline.21 None-
theless, warships maintain their status, even if civilians form part of the crew 
if they have been designated as a warship by the flag State.22 In the United 
States, all Navy ships designated “USS” and Coast Guard vessels designated 
“USCGC” are considered warships under international law.23  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
18. OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 17, art. 12; COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK , supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 3.3.3.3; 
GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 17, ¶ 1020. 
19. Hague VII, supra note 17, arts. 1–4; Convention on the High Seas art. 8, Apr. 29, 
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 29; 
A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR: TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS 
WITH COMMENTARIES 316–20 (1909); NWIP 10-2, supra note 17, § 500C; COMMANDER’S 
HANDBOOK , supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 13.4.1. 
20. HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 316–20; C. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
THE SEA § 270 (6th ed. 1967). 
21. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 
supra note 17, § 13.4.1. 
22. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, 
supra note 17, §§ 4.16.1, 4.16.2. 
23. U.S. Department of the Navy, United States Navy Regulations art. 0406 (1990); U.S. 
Department of the Navy, SECNAVINST 5030.8c, General Guidance for the Classification 
of Naval Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures (2016). The U.S. Coast Guard 











III. ENEMY MERCHANT VESSELS 
 
Enemy merchant vessels can only be attacked if they become a military ob-
jective by their conduct or operation. However, even if not engaged in acts 
that would allow them to be attacked,24 they may be captured and (after ad-
judication) condemned as prizes.25 Using merchant vessels to actively sup-
port military operations during an IAC forfeits their protected status and 
intentionally puts civilians in harm’s way. For example, all Chinese-flagged 
container ships at sea or in port would be targetable given the inability to 
detect whether the ships have a Klub-K battery onboard until the weapon 




Enemy merchant vessels may be captured anywhere beyond neutral territory. 
If military circumstances do not permit capture and adjudication as an enemy 
prize, the merchant vessel may be destroyed after taking all possible 
measures to provide for the safety of the passengers and crew. The officers 
and crew of a captured enemy merchant ship may be detained as prisoners 
of war.26 However, if the enemy merchant ship did not take part in the hos-
tilities, the officers and crew should not be detained if they “make a formal 
promise in writing, not to undertake, while hostilities last, any service con-
nected with the operations of the war.”27 Enemy merchant vessels may resist 
attacks or capture by enemy forces but may not commit hostile acts in of-




As a general rule, as embodied in the London Protocol, international law 
prohibits the destruction of an enemy merchant vessel unless the safety of 
                                                                                                                      
24. See infra Section III.B.  
25. Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War, A Handbook on Economic 
Warfare (1939), reprinted in SEA POWER AND THE CONTROL OF TRADE: BELLIGERENT 
RIGHTS FROM THE RUSSIAN WAR TO THE BEIRA PATROL, 1854–1970, at 445, 465 (Nicholas 
Tracy ed., 2005).  
26. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 8.6.2.1. 
27. Convention No. XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise 
of the Right of Capture in Naval War arts. 6, 8, Oct 18, 1907, Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544; 
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 4.16.2. 











passengers and crew is first assured.29 During World War II, however, enemy 
merchant ships were routinely attacked and sunk by belligerent warships and 
submarines without prior warning and without first providing for the safety 
of the passengers and crew. Initially, the belligerents justified these attacks 
as reprisals. As the war progressed, merchant vessels on both sides were 
armed and convoyed by warships, collected intelligence, or were otherwise 
incorporated into the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort and were 
therefore regarded as legitimate military objectives. Although the 1936 Lon-
don Protocol remains valid, it has been interpreted in light of State practice 
during and after World War II. An enemy merchant vessel may therefore be 
attacked and destroyed, either with or without prior warning if it:  
 
1. Persistently refuses to stop upon being duly summoned to do so; 
2. Actively resists visit and search or capture; 
3. Sails under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft;  
4. Is armed with systems or weapons beyond that required for self-
defense against terrorists, piracy, or like threats; 
5. Is incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence sys-
tem of the enemy’s armed forces; 
6. Acts in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy’s 
armed forces; 
7. Is integrated into the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort 
and compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, 
under the circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the sur-
face warship to imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mis-
sion accomplishment.30  
 
C. Protected Civilian Vessels 
 
Certain classes of enemy vessels are exempt from capture or destruction if 
they are innocently employed in their exempt category. These vessels lose 
their protected status if they take part in hostilities or hamper the movement 
                                                                                                                      
29. Procès-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of 
the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, reprinted in 31 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 137 (1939); NWIP 10-2, supra 
note 17, § 503b(3); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, §§ 8.6.2.1, 8.6.2.2; DOD LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 13.5.2. 
30. NWIP 10-2, supra note 17, § 503b(3); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 











of combatants, refuse to submit to identification and inspection procedures, 
or refuse an order to stay out of the area of operations. Civilian passenger 
vessels at sea may be captured but are exempt from destruction unless they 
are used by the enemy for a military purpose (e.g., transporting troops or 
military cargo), resist capture, or refuse to comply with the direction of the 
intercepting warship.31 China has a legal obligation not to take advantage of 
the exempt character of a vessel in order to use it for a military purpose while 
purportedly preserving its innocent appearance. This obligation would be 
violated by using a nondescript RORO ferry as an amphibious assault ship 
to support an amphibious landing. Moreover, any RORO ferry operating 
outside its normal coastal sea routes or in the area of military operations 
would be at risk of being attacked since it would be virtually impossible to 
distinguish a militarily enhanced ferry from a normal ferry and would be pre-
sumed to be supporting the invasion fleet. 
 
D. Conversion of Merchant Vessels 
 
Merchant vessels can become warships if they are converted into a warship 
by the flag State consistent with the rules set out in Hague VII. The Con-
vention requires that converted merchant ships: (1) be placed under the di-
rect authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the State whose flag 
it flies, (2) bear the external marks that distinguish the warships of their na-
tionality, (3) be under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the 
service of the State whose name is on the list of the officers of the fighting 
fleet, and (4) be manned by a crew subject to military discipline.32 Once con-
verted into a warship, merchant vessels must comply with the LOAC.33 Ad-
ditionally, a belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, 
as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of warships.34 Once 
a merchant vessel is converted and announced in the list of warships, it be-
comes a valid military objective and may be targeted or captured on sight. 
To the extent China places container missile systems on civilian con-
tainer ships for the purpose of conducting offensive precision strikes during 
an IAC, it must first convert and designate the container ship as a warship 
consistent with Hague VII. Similarly, to the extent China converts heavy-lift 
                                                                                                                      
31. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 8.6.3. 
32. Hague VII, supra note 17, arts. 1–4. 
33. Id. art. 5. 











commercial ships and RORO vessels into amphibious assault ships to sup-
port combat operations in an IAC, it must first convert and designate the 
commercial vessels as warships in accordance with Hague VII.  
Whether China will comply with these requirements is questionable, at 
best. In the past, Chinese-flagged civilian vessels, which had not been desig-
nated warships, were used to conduct offensive belligerent acts in support 
of PLAN operations. Following a series of incidents between South Viet-
namese warships and Chinese fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of the 
Western Paracel Islands (Crescent Group), Chinese forces seized the islands 
from South Vietnam on January 20, 1974. The Chinese invasion force was 
comprised of a flotilla of PLAN warships and civilian maritime militia fishing 
boats, which were used as de facto amphibious assault ships to land PLA 
troops on the islands.35 
 
IV. PERFIDY (TREACHERY) 
 
International law prohibits the killing or wounding of the enemy by resorting 
to perfidy.36 Perfidy is defined as an act that invites the confidence of the 
enemy to lead them to believe that they are entitled to, or are obliged to 
accord, protection under the LOAC, with intent to betray that confidence.37 
The key element is the false claim to protections under the LOAC to secure 
a military advantage over the opponent.38 An example of perfidy would be 
feigning civilian status as a merchant vessel and then engaging the enemy 
with a Klub-K missile battery or feigning status as a passenger ferry and then 
participating in an amphibious assault.  
                                                                                                                      
35. See Ho van Ky-Thoai, Naval Battle of the Paracels, in VOICES FROM THE SECOND 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM (1967–1975), at 153 (K.W. Taylor ed., 2014); Toshi Yoshi-
hara, The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle, 69 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1, 6–10 (2016); Derek 
Grossman & Logan Ma, A Short History of China’s Fishing Militia and What It May Tell Us, 
THERANDBLOG (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/a-short-history-of-
chinas-fishing-militia-and-what.html. 
36. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Annex 
to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2295; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, §§ 5.4.2, 5.21, 5.22., 5.22.2. 
37. Protocol (I) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 5.22.1. 
38. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 











Q-ships are a historical example. During World War I and II, Allied mer-
chant ships, known as Q-ships, were armed to counter Germany’s effective 
use of U-boats to interdict allied shipping.39 They would loiter in sea lanes 
or straggle behind allied convoys, inviting U-boats to attack. When hailed, a 
portion of the crew would purportedly abandon ship. When the U-boat sur-
faced to sink the ship, the Q-ships would uncover their concealed weapons, 
raise the naval ensign, and open fire on the submarine.40 Most experts today 
would consider that the use of Q-ships is no longer acceptable and would 




Generally, enemy civilian vessels shall not be the object of attack. Enemy 
merchant vessels may be captured as prizes but should not be attacked out-
right unless they become a military objective by their conduct or operation. 
It is not unlawful to convert merchant vessels into warships or use such ves-
sels as naval auxiliaries so long as China follows the rules, something it has 
not shown a propensity to do in other contexts (e.g., use of excessive force 
in maritime law enforcement operations; intentional violations of the 
COLREGS, UNCLOS, and SOLAS; failure to comply with the International 
Health Regulations42 during the COVID-19 pandemic; etc.). Failure to com-
ply with the law of armed conflict by surreptitiously incorporating merchant 
vessels into China’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort endangers civilian sea-
farers and puts all civilian ships at risk that may be operating in the area of 
hostilities. 
                                                                                                                      
39. E. KEBLE CHATTERTON, Q-SHIPS AND THEIR STORY: A HISTORY OF DECOY VES-
SELS (1922).  
40. RODNEY CARLISLE, SOVEREIGNTY AT SEA: U.S. MERCHANT SHIPS AND AMERI-
CAN ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR I 26–27 (2009); 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HISTORY OF 
UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II 281–85 (2010).  
41. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA 186 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995). 
42. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3d 
ed. 2005). 
